The Moon and the Ghetto / ritipulmama.cf Tragic Choices / GUIDOCALABRESIand PHIUPBOBBITT. Micromotives and Macrobehavior / THOMASC. Thomas Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Norton Chapter 4: " Sorting and Mixing". Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR. SORTING AND MIXING: RACE AND SEX. The similarity ends there, and nobody is about to propose a.
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Schelling, T., Micromotives and macrobehavior pdf - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. Nonlinear Dynamics between Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Saori Iwanaga & Akira Namatame. Dept. of Computer Science,. National Defense Academy. , Micromotives and Macrobehavior. WW Norton and. Company. Suppose we observe a city with neighborhoods that looks like this. Can.
And some parts of this book. If the book reads well it is largely because Joyce Huntley Quelch types superb copy with such speed and good humor. Economic Progress. Michael Spence. Howard Raiffa. Julius Margolis asked me to use the Fels Lectures to collect some thoughts he knew I was working on.
I might have collected them anyway. Mancur Olson. Acknowledgments When I reflect on it I am surprised at how much of what I write. Philip B. Parts of Chapters 3 and 4 were in Robin Marris ed. They are Graham T. Emmanuel Mesthene urged me. I write at somebody's invitation. Charles L. The Corporate Society Macmillan. Edith M.
Private Values. Sage Publications. Concealed Weapons. A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities. There were no seating arrangements and no ushers. What are we to suppose those prefer- ences were? It is possible that everybody preferred the whole audience to pack itself into the two dozen rows toward the rear.
Those in the front—the thirteenth. They hadn't. I gave my lecture. People did not vote with their bottoms on a seating plan. Resisting slightly. I was pushed gently out of the wings and toward the rostrum.
People toward the front or rear did not seem to be older or better dressed or pre- dominately male or female. All they did was to choose where to sit from among the available seats they could see as they scanned the hall while walking down the aisle. I assumed that 8: I could see the first dozen rows: I asked my hosts why they had arranged the seating that way. Feel- ing a little as though I were addressing a crowd on the oppo- site bank of a river.
I followed my escort into the building through the stage entrance and stood in the wings as a microphone was put around my neck. Can we guess what policy people followed in choosing their seats? I should add that. There were eight hundred people in the hall. The arrangement was voluntary. The dynamics had to be consistent with the populating of a compact area by people who could not know how many would be arriving later. Did they fill in sequence from back to front?
Did people distribute themselves at random among the rearward two dozen rows? Or did the first arrivals fill the thirteenth row. Residential location is an. One is that we do not like the result. Curious as I was. That last is improbable: A second reason for interest is that there may be something about this process that reminds us of other situations in which people locate themselves voluntarily in some pattern that does not possess evident advantages even for the people who by their own choices form the pattern.
And before we do any such thing we ought to know whether the audience itself likes the seating arrangement that it chose. I neglected to ask my hosts about the order in which the different rows were filled. If we want to change the pattern with a minimum of organization. I could see their eyelids droop or their heads nod. There are several reasons we might interest ourselves in what it is that those people were doing.
My immediate purpose in inviting you to speculate on the motives that led to that seating pattern is neither to develop a handbook of auditorium management nor to draw analogies with residential choice or the behavior of crowds or the filling of parking lots. But if most people turn their lights on when some fraction of the oncoming cars already have their lights on.
Alternatively this kind of analysis may do what I invited you to do—to try to figure out what intentions. This laboratory experiment in the auditorium can give us hints of what to look for in other situations.
In the second case. That kind of analysis explores the relation between the behavior characteristics of the individuals who comprise some social aggregate. There are easy cases. We could even get our compass bearings by reflecting that the cas- cade of lights on the Massachusetts Turnpike will flow west- ward as dusk settles. If there are several plausible behaviors that could lead to what we observed. What this book is about is a kind of analysis that is characteristic of a large part of the social sciences.
If we know that every driver. This analysis sometimes uses what is known about individ- ual intentions to predict the aggregates: It is to give a vivid example of what this book is about.
These situations. What are some plausible conjectures—alternative hypotheses—about what it is that those people were doing that could lead to the result I described? How do we evaluate the result in the light of each hypothesis?
How might we influence the result. Sometimes the dynamics are reciprocal: And can we investigate the several hypotheses. People are respond- ing to an environment that consists of other people responding to their environment. And sometimes the results are surprising. To make that connection we usually have to look at the system of interaction between indi- viduals and their environment.
Sometimes the dynamics are sequential: But even inconclusive analysis can warn against jumping to conclusions about individual intentions from observations of aggregates. Sometimes they are not easily guessed. We needn't assume that they all had the same intentions. How much leeway does each hypothesis allow for the role of chance.
The earliest arrivals get to sit far- thest to the rear. I honk mine. Sometimes it is inconclusive. Return to that audience of mine and speculate a little on the motives that might lead people to sit as they did. An obvious possibility is that everybody likes to sit as close to the rear as possible. Sometimes the analysis is difficult. A fourth possibility is that everybody likes to watch the audience come in.
If the first few arrivals happen to sit toward the rear. To do that the early arrivals sit far enough back to make allowance for later arriv- als. They just didn't get there. Maybe they like to get out first afterward. But in one case they are sitting down front and in the other toward the rear. A third possibility is that everybody wants to sit where he is close to people. To avoid craning. Blocking off the last dozen rows would translate them all a dozen seats forward.
We may like one result better. If we could get the first few people to sit toward the front. From then on there's no room except toward the front.
A second possibility.
Micromotives and Macrobehavior--Thomas C. Schelling.pdf -...
Either way the early arrivals get surrounded and everybody is bunched. Or they may like it better. They may prefer everybody else to be as far forward as possible. There is one hypothesis that I find interesting because it is so minimal. He just does not want to sit in the first one. Or if we had people enter from the front instead of the rear. Still another hypothesis is that most members of the audi- ence developed their seating habits in other times and places.
Without thinking about it. If we could estimate the size of the crowd and block off the back rows. And so forth. But that behavior would have to be coupled with a rule of decorum—that the first person in any row must go midway between the two aisles and the next people must move alongside to minimize the climbing over—for this "minimum effort" hypothesis to give us the result we observed.
This is that nobody cares where he sits. Once the audience is seated there is no advantage in sitting to the rear—either to the rear of the other people.
We could even propose that people are merely tired and take the nearest vacant seat when they enter the room. Out of two dozen rows that might be partially filled. To be on the safe side. And they might all be just as happy. And if we then open the lower end of the tube so that most of the. Nature abhors a vacuum. But if we fill a J-shaped tube with water and close the lower end so that the water in the pipe cannot achieve its own level.
The people in the other 23 rows surely would prefer to have the whole crowd shifted forward. Soap bubbles minimize surface tension and light travels a path that. Water seeks its own level.
An even weaker hypothesis is that people don't even mind being in the very first occupied row as long as the rows imme- diately behind them are filled.
In other sciences. What we typically have is a mode of contingent behavior—behavior that depends on what others are doing. Purposive Behavior Notice that in all of these hypotheses there is a notion of people's having preferences. That can lead to the same result. With people.
An advantage in dealing with "goal-seeking" unconscious substances. This is the method of "vicarious problem solving" that underlies most of microeconomics. They are not simply acting "as if" they dislike being burnt. And if we know what problem a person is trying to solve. But with people it's different. When we analyze how people behave in trying to escape from a burning building we mean that they really are trying to escape.
Lately there are some amongst us who think that sunflowers are anguished if they cannot follow the sun. Most of us don't think that light is really in a hurry. If we are in the lumber busi- ness we like the leaves to succeed. In fact. What makes this evaluation interesting and difficult is that the entire aggregate outcome is what has to be evaluated. How well each does for himself in adapting to his social environment is not the same thing as how satisfactory a social environment they collectively create for themselves.
The ranger will be con- cerned with whether or not the buffalo do disappear. Some may have wished. If it has been extinct for a million years his curiosity is surely without concern. It is hard to explore what happens when people behave with a purpose without becoming curious. In a burning building it may be wise to run.
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The naturalist can be interested in what causes a species to become extinct. Social scientists are more like forest rangers than like natural- ists. And we can exaggerate how much good is accomplished when people achieve the goals we think they think they have been pursuing. Everyone who entered my auditorium may have done a good job of picking the best seat available at the moment he entered the room.
But the most interesting ques- tion is not how many people would like to change their seats after they see where everybody else is sitting. We can forget that people pursue misguided goals or don't know their goals. There are refineries to make the airplane fuel and trucks to transport it.
The dairy farmer doesn't need to know how many people eat butter and how far away they are.
In economics the "individuals" are people. There's butter and cheese for lunch on the airplane. What he needs to know is the prices of different feeds. They know the prices of the things they download and sell.
Most people. Somehow all of the activities seem to get coordinated. There's a taxi to get you to the airport. The fact that there is never a taxi when you need one in the rain.
We expect this fantastically complex. An important part of social biology is relating the world of the individual ant to the world of the ant colony. Tens of millions of people making billions of decisions every week about what to download and what to sell and where to work and how much to save and how much to borrow and what orders to fill and what stocks to accumulate and where to move and what schools to go to and what jobs to take and where to build the supermarkets and movie theatres and elec- tric power stations.
Amazement needn't be admi- ration: Why the system works as it does. I am only inviting you to reflect that whether this system works well or ill. The colony is full of patterns and regularities and balanced propor- tions among different activities.
It is generally not believed that any ant in an ant colony knows how the ant colony works. Each ant has certain things that it does. No ant designed the system. How it works—how it is that the limited set of choices made by each ant within its own truncated little world translates.
But no individual ant knows whether there are too few or too many ants exploring for food or rebuilding after a thunderstorm or helping to carry in the carcass of a beetle. Each ant lives in its own little world. Two hundred years ago Adam Smith characterized the system as one that worked as if some unseen hand brought about the coordination. If Canadian farmers ship too many Christmas trees to Albany and not enough to.
What I asked you to be amazed at. Then we can try to evaluate whether. If we see pattern and order and regularity. In economics it often appears that a lot of this unmanaged and unguided individual activity leads to aggregate results that are not too bad. What they do is to infer. I am interested here in how much promise the economist's result has outside eco- nomics. The market may even perform disas- trously where inflation and depression are concerned.
The free market may not do much. If economists have studied the matter for two hundred years and many of them have concluded that a comparatively unrestricted free market is often an advantageous way of let- ting individuals interact with each other. It may lead to asymmetrical personal relationships between employee and employer. For my purpose there's no need to reach a judgment about just how well the "free market" does what is attributed to it.
The result is often characterized by the statement that "the market works. A lot may be wrong with the deduc- tive reasoning of economists.
All of these are activities in which people's behavior is influenced by the behavior of others. Most of these activities are substantially free of centralized manage- ment in many societies. Presently I shall envimerate and discuss some of those other activities aside from choosing seats in an audito- rium. Then there are eating and drinking habits.
But the next gener- ation's notions of what is tall and what is short will be affected by whether in this generation tall people marry tall people and short people short.
The dictionary may eventually tell me what a seven-year-old means by "dyna- mite. And though people may care how it all comes out in the aggregate. Hardly anybody who marries a tall person. There is equilibrium in the market for gaso- line if prices from place to place do not differ more than trans- port costs between those places.
But before that I need to dispose of a false issue that gets too much attention. In economics there is an "equilibrium" distribution of Christmas trees. If you pour cream in your coffee there will be one kind of "equi- librium" when the surface has stopped rippling. And equilibrium can be partial or more complete. It can be always approached but never quite achieved. Economics covers a special case—a large and important special case.
A method of analysis that is common in economics. An equilibrium can be exact or approximate. The point to make here is that there is nothing particularly attractive about an equilibrium. High- way speeds are in equilibrium vis-a-vis the state police when arrests are just frequent enough to offset the urge to drive a little faster. A public beach in the summertime is in equilibrium when it is so crowded that it is no longer attractive to anyone who might have wanted to go to the beach.
The idea of equilibrium is an acknowledgment that there are adjustment processes. The body of a hanged man is in equilibrium when it. But nobody should resist "equilibrium analysis" for fear that.
The world's whale population is in equilibrium when the remaining whales are so few that hardly anybody can catch enough to make a good business out of it. An equilibrium is simply a result. There may be many things wrong with "equilibrium analy- sis.
In Malthusian analysis. It is what is there after something has settled down. How well people accomplish what they want to accomplish depends on what others are doing. If your problem is that there is too much traffic.
If you join a crowd because you like crowds. Your vocabulary and your pronunciation depend on the vocabular- ies and accents of others. The difference between economics and those other social phenomena will not. How you drive depends on how others drive. The seating pattern is an equilibrium if. An unnecessary source of distrust of economic analysis is the assumption that when an economist discusses equilibrium he is expressing approval. Exchanges and Other Transactions To identify what makes economics a large and important special case.
Whom you marry depends on whom you meet. I believe that assump- tion is usually—not always. Calling it an equilibrium does not imply that everybody—or even anybody—likes the seating arrange- ment. An economist would describe the seating pattern in our audito- rium in terms of equilibria just as he would the market for air conditioning. What people do affects what other people do. It is that people are impinging on other people and adapting to other people. Nor does it imply that there are not alternative seating patterns.
Now for what is special about economics. When you cut your hair short you change. Somebody may believe that chicken farms are cruel. Economics is mainly concerned with transactions in which everybody affected is a voluntary participant. Nobody else cares or needs to know whether you have a hard boiled egg or a lettuce-and-tomato sandwich for lunch.
Usually you both care and are influenced. If you raise your voice to make yourself heard. Sometimes you care what it is that the others are doing: If you withdraw your child from school be- cause of the pupils he goes to school with.
If you neither care nor are influ- enced. Your neighbor may steal eggs because he knows that you'll trade vegetables for them. If anybody affected is part.
Of course this is an exaggeration: Eggs may have more cholesterol than is good for you. On certain conditions. Some- times you don't care but you need to adapt: The neighbor who traded with you may have known that the egg was diseased. The epitome is trading veg- etables for eggs over the back fence.
People lack the knowledge to shop around for medical care. Some markets are easily monopolized. Economists are aware of a multitude of reasons why mar- kets may not work to everybody's satisfaction.
At least it is a good thing if we think it a good thing for people to have more of what they like when they can have it at nobody else's expense. A lot of legal and institutional arrangements are designed to protect the rights of people who might. Behind a typical free market is centuries of patient development of property rights and other legal arrangements. In addition to physical protec- tion and contract enforcement. It is hard to tell a good secondhand auto from a bad one. There are a lot of requirements for making the free market work well.
I have men- tioned some. It is hard to sell a secret without giving it away. Think of all the things you can actually pur- chase by telephone. In identifying these problem cases.
I'll complain if nobody downloads my book. Upon inspection it turns out that although the market indeed can work for certain kinds of medicine and certain kinds of information and certain kinds of insurance and certain kinds of performance contracts.
There are also the markets we don't like that work entirely too well. The market for brave watchmen will fail if the obli- gation to be brave in an emergency is unenforceable. Notice that in all these cases there was some initial reason to expect that the market might work.
What the market is often so good at doing is only part of what happens in the market. People feel obliged to send cards to people from whom.
But now look at an activity that at first glance is like a "market activity" but upon closer inspection isn't.
I may feel "affected" by the transaction because the alternative I had in mind was selling you my book instead. To make my point I'll choose a non-controversial illustration familiar to most of us. My impression—and I've found nobody who doesn't share it—is that the sending of Christmas cards is an "interactive process" greatly affected by custom and by expectations of what others expect and what others may send. In addition to personal greetings we have cards from teachers to students and students to teachers.
While coordinating activities efficiently. But I mean the choosing of whom to send a card to. This is why I invited only your amazement. There is a literal market for Christmas cards—a market for downloading them. I can wish that people wanted. Sensible people who might readily agree to stop bothering each other with Christmas cards find it embarrassing. People sometimes send cards only because.
At first glance someone might call this exchange of greet- ings a "free market activity. And "market" is a remote and unhelpful analogy. My casual inquiry suggests widespread if not unanimous opinion that the system has some of the characteristics of a trap. There is no mechanism that attunes individual responses to some collective accomplishment. Some wish for a "bankruptcy" proceeding in which all Christ- mas-card lists could be obliterated so people could start over.
People send cards early to avoid the suspicion that they were sent only after one had already been received. There is no mechanism that would induce people to stop sending cards merely. And there isn't much that anybody can do about it.
If they could. It cannot even be argued that if the whole system worked badly enough it would become extinct. Things don't work out optimally for a simple reason: Even people who. Nobody claims that the system reaches optimal results. Some wish the whole institution could be wiped out. Even if everybody guesses correctly the cards he will receive.
Stu- dents send cards to teachers believing that other students do. When observation showed incontrovertibly that they did not. There was a time when wise people thought planets should revolve in circles.
The free market. Just as a woodcutter wouldn't cut wood if bystanders were free to carry it away as fast as he cut it. Contrived Markets and Partial Markets I must add two qualifications. Circles were not the norm. In the end it was realized that. The legal invention of "copyright" makes the written word a marketable commodity. The beach that is so overcrowded on a hot day that many people are not attracted and some leave in disgust and even those that remain don't enjoy it much can be better exploited by the people to whom the beach belongs if attendance is reg- ulated by an admission fee.
The first is that it is often possible. Only some ellipses are circles. When we ask why the "free market" in Christmas cards doesn't lead to optimal exchange. Property law doesn't let me pick your vegetables and give them to my friends.
The market transactions involve only the landlord and tenant. The market for pets does not reflect the interest of bird lovers in the market for cats. The market may appear to work well for the production and distribution of perfumes. But it matches people only with living quarters.
The second qualification is that markets often appear to work toward greater harmony than they do. It works with the crowds at public beaches but not with the crowds that gather to watch a building burn.
Or admissions can be rationed among beachgoers. Creating something like a market is a principle of wide useful- ness. A market appears to do a pretty good job of allocating houses and apartments to people who need places to live.
Some social conse- quences have been left out of account. But is far from universally applicable.
These are not "free-market arrangements. But the system is modelled on market principles. Copyright laws will not keep people from passing malicious rumors. Each offers something complementary to the other. Marriage itself. There is more here than just a remote analogy with long-term bilateral exclusive-service contracts. Except for the very rich. Yet marital choices in the aggregate have enormous influence on the genetic.
Collective behavior. Social problems. S Acknowledgments When I reflect on it I am surprised at how much of what I write, including things that please me, I write at somebody's invitation. Julius Margolis asked me to use the Fels Lectures to collect some thoughts he knew I was working on; I might have collected them anyway, but I might not, and surely not so soon.
Emmanuel Mesthene urged me. They are Graham T. First arrivals may choose to sit in the last row. The reasons behind these choices could be either to see others arrive watching others arrive in their finery as at a wedding or to be in positions in that last row to be able to leave first or leave before the lecture is over without embarrassing themselves. By these first arrivals taking the last row, however, their choices have a strong influence on the others arriving afterward.
Some humans have a "bunching" instinct, others feel more comfortable being near others and still others do not like to mark out new territory.
As a result, as the last row fills up, the most likely impact on the later arrivals is that, due to one of the reasons listed before, they will begin to sit in rows just in front of the back row. There may be some later arrivals who will strike out new territory and others who will feel comfortable following these pioneers.
Once all the seating is completed, not everyone will be happy with their locations since later arrivals run out of choices. This exercise explained in everyday terms is technically termed "spatial distribution.
For example, a critical mass model indicated the cyclic behavior of measles outbreaks in a poor African community. After children were immunized against measles, mothers would observe that the community was free of the disease.Notice that.
Sometimes the analysis is difficult. In fact, we can often ascribe to people some capacity to solve problemsto calculate or to perceive intuitively how to get from here to there. This time there is little undershoot. The market for brave watchmen will fail if the obli- gation to be brave in an emergency is unenforceable. Calling it an equilibrium does not imply that everybody—or even anybody—likes the seating arrange- ment. A second possibility, not the same thing, is that everybody wants to sit to the rear of everybody elsenot to the rear of the hall, just behind the other people.